WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH 248 Va. 485, 450 S.E.2d 361 (1994) Supreme Court of Virginia by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 14
Spring 3-1-1995
WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH 248 Va. 485,
450 S.E.2d 361 (1994) Supreme Court of Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
This Casenote, Va. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH 248 Va. 485, 450 S.E.2d 361 (1994) Supreme Court of Virginia, 7 Cap. Def. Dig. 31 (1995).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol7/iss2/14
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2 - Page 31
Stromberg appears to place the burden on the prosecution to show that the
illegitimate basis was not used to convict the defendant. Again, the jury's
verdict in Stromberg was a general one. The general verdict appears to
have been the dispositive factor in this case, as it was impossible to tell
which grounds the jury used to convict the defendant. 33 Thus, with a
general verdict the defendant need only show that one of the grounds was
unconstitutional. Presumably the burden is on the prosecution to show
that the illegitimate grounds were not used to convict the defendant.
Applying that reasoning here, Strickler's conviction could have
been based either on the abduction with intent to defile predicate offense
(illegitimate) or the armed robbery predicate offense (legitimate). Since
the jury's verdict does not clearly identify which offense it used to
convict Strickler, underStromberg the Supreme Court of Virginia cannot
assume that the jury convicted Strickler based on the legitimate (i.e.,
correctly-instructed) offense. The prosecution would have to show that
abduction with intent to defile was not used to convict Strickler.
Obviously defense attorneys should take care to insure that clients
are not convicted of capital murder based on a non-existent capital
murder offense. The first step is always to compare the evidence of the
offense in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to provisions
of section 18.2-31. The statute is complex. For example, it contains two
separate abduction sections-sections 18.2-31(1) and 18.2-31(8) (the
33 Id.
34 The Supreme Court of Virginia has addressed this issue many
times and has continually held that"[i]n a robbery prosecution, where the
violence against the victim and the trespass to his property combine in a
continuing, unbroken sequence of events, the robbery itself continues as
well for the same period of time." Linwood Earl Briley v. Common-
wealth, 221 Va. 532, 543, 273 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1980), cert. denied, 451
subject of this case). Both of these subsections in turn refer to another
statute, section 18.2-48. This statute covers drug-related homicides and
incorporates by reference several other Virginia statutory provisions, but
falls far short of encompassing all drug-related murders. If a statutory
section is inapplicable under any evidence that could be presented by the
Commonwealth, appropriate pre-trial actions may be taken to eliminate
the charge from the case. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse can
help defense counsel with this problem.
Additionally, if a claim is defaulted as in Strickler, Stromberg may
be of little help. Even though the Supreme Court of Virginia has broadly
construed robbery's requirement of forcible taking from the victim to
includetakings afterdeath, 34 that interpretation might well not have been
as clear to the jury. The jury might well have found that the murder was
committed during an abduction with intent to defile. Once no objection
wasmade, however, theissuewasevaluated andStrickland, notStromberg,
applied. The burden shifted to the defendant to prove prejudice-an
impossible task if the robbery evidence was sufficient and the real basis
for the guilty verdict was unknown.
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig
U.S. 1031 (1981); accord Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,
373-74,402 S.E.2d 218,224, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). See also
case summary of Quesinberry, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.
23 (1991); and Green, Narrowing the Scope of Capital Murder During
the Commission of a Robbery: When Must the Intent to Rob Arise?,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 4 5 (1993).
RAMDASS v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 518, 450 S.E.2d 360 (1994)
WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 485, 450 S.E.2d 361 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Bobby Lee Ramdass was convicted for the capital murder of
Mohammad Kayani. The capital murder charge was predicated on the
commission of murder during the commission of a robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon. 1 The jury fixed Ramdass' punishment at death,
based on the "future dangerousness" aggravator of Virginia's capital
murder statute. 2 The trial court imposed this sentence and sentences for
the underlying crimes.3 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this
judgement and the sentences imposed.4
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (Supp. 1994).
2 Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 518,519,450 S.E.2d 360,
360 (1994).
3 Id. The court imposed a life sentence for the robbery and a four
year sentence for the firearms violation.
4 Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413,437 S.E.2d 566 (1993).
5 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (Supp. 1994).
6 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1994).
Dwayne Allen Wright was convicted of two offenses of capital
murderforthekilling of SabaTekle in the commission of a robbery while
armed with a deadly weapon5 and the killing of Tekle subsequent tc
attempted rape.6 The jury fixed Wright's punishment at death based or
the "future dangerousness" aggravator.7 The trial court imposed this
sentence and other sentences for the underlying crimes.8 The Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the judgments and sentence of death. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari forbott
of these cases on June 20, 1994, vacating the judgments and remandinj
both cases "for further consideration in light of Simmons v. Soutt
Carolina."10
7 Wright v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 486,450 S.E2d 362 (1994)
8 Id. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the robbery, ter
years' imprisonment for the attempted rape, and two years imprisonmen
for the firearm violation.
9 Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 427 S.E.2d 379 (1993)
10 Ramdass v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994); Wright v. Virginia
114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
11 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
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HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that in Simmons v. South
Carolina11 the United States Supreme Court required that a jury is
entitled to be informed of parole information only when the defendant is
ineligible for parole and "future dangerousness" is at issue in the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.
12
It further determined that at the time their penalty was being
considered, both Ramdass and Wright would not have been ineligible for
parole if sentenced to life imprisonment so therefore it was unnecessary
to inform their sentencing juries concerning parole law. 13 The court
affirmed both trial court decisions and reinstated the capital murder
convictions and death sentences.
14
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court of Virginia has taken a narrow view of the
holding in Simmons v. South Carolina by allowing parole information to
be provided to the jury only when the defendant was "ineligible forparole
at the time he was before the sentencing jury."
15
In Virginia parole eligibility is defined in Virginia Code section
53.1-151. A person is not eligible for parole if that person has been
sentenced to death; has been convicted of three separate felony offenses
of murder, rape or robbery by the presenting of a deadly weapon; or
convicted of three separate felony controlled substance violations.
16
Also, any person who is convicted of an offense and sentenced to life
imprisonment after being paroled from a previous life sentence shall not
be eligible for parole. 17
Both Ramdass and Wright were potentially ineligible for parole
under the "three strikes" rule established by Virginia Code section 53.1 -
151(B1). Due to the bifurcated trial process in a capital murder case,18
the outcome of the guilt phase of the capital murder trial does constitute
one offense that is used in the calculation for parole eligibility. However,
the statute states that the felony offenses may not be "part of a common
act, transaction or scheme" for them to be counted separately, thus the
predicate felonies that underlie the capital murder conviction may not be
used in this calculation. 19
Dwayne Wright had previously been convicted in Maryland of first
degree murder, attempted murder, and two firearm offenses.20 Only the
murder conviction was an offense that could be counted as an offense
which fits the requirements of Code section 53.1-15(B 1). The only other
conviction for Wright was at the guilt phase of the capital murder trial.
Thus Wright had only two "strikes" and was not ineligible for parole.
Under the Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis of the Simmons holding,
the determination that Wright was not ineligible for parole and that the
jury was thus not entitled to parole law information is proper.
Prior to his capital murder conviction, Bobby Lee Ramdass had
been convicted for the armed robberies of two persons in Fairfax County.
These robberies were part of the same transaction and were only counted
12 Ramdass, 248 Va. at 520, 450 S.E.2d at 361; Wright, 248 Va. at
487, 450 S.E.2d at 362.
13 Ramdass, 248 Va. at 520,450 S.E.2d at 361; Wright, 248 Va. at
485, 450 S.E.2d at 363.
14 Ramdass, 248 Va. at 521,450 S.E.2d at 361; Wright, 248 Va. at
487, 450 S.E.2d at 363.
15 Wright, 248 Va. at 487, 450 S.E.2d at 362.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B) (Supp. 1994).
17 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(E) (Supp. 1994).
18 Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.3, 264.4 (1990).
19 Va. Code Ann. § 53.151(B1) (Supp. 1994). The court correctly
applies this principle in Ramdass. See Ramdass, 248 Va. at 520, 450
S.E.2d at 361.
as one felony offense under Code section 53.1-151 (B 1).21 Ramdass also
argued that he had been convicted of an armed robbery in Alexandria on
January 7, 1933. These two separate convictions, combined with the
capital murder conviction, would have made Ramdass ineligible for
parole. The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the January 7
conviction was a "conviction by a jury" and that "[j]udgment had not
been entered on the verdict; therefore it cannot be considered as a
conviction under Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B1)." 22 The court cited
Smith v. Commonwealth23 as its basis for holding that this conviction was
not one that could be used in the parole eligibility calculation. In Smith
a Commonwealth's attorney was found guilty of a violation of the"White
Slave Act"24 by a federal court jury. The accused moved the federal court
to set aside this verdict and the court continued the case until the next
term. The Commonwealth used this "conviction" as the basis for a
complaint in state court that sought the removal of the attorney from his
office under section 2705 of the Virginia Code of 1919, which allowed
for removal if the officer was "convicted of an act constituting a violation
of a penal statute involving moral turpitude." 25 The Supreme Court of
Virginia held that judgment must have been ordered by the federal court
on the jury's verdict before the "conviction" requirement of the state
removal statute had been met.
26
The court in Smith discussed the different definitions that may be
given to the word "conviction." The court admitted that many authorities
designate that the "ordinary legal meaning" of conviction is "not that
judgment has been entered or sentence pronounced, but only that a
verdict of guilt has been returned."'27 The court stated, however, that this
definition has only been applied when "the context in which the word is
found has reference merely to something which should or may be done
at aparticular stage in acriminal prosecution triable by jury....'-28 When
the meaning of conviction would impose any "punitive consequences as
the result of the conviction of the offense," then a verdict will not be
sufficient to establish a "conviction" when judgment has not been
entered on that verdict.29 The rationale for this decision appears to be that
when the determination of whether a person has been "convicted" will be
used to the detriment of the person, "conviction" must be read in the
strictest sense and thus requires entry ofjudgment by the court. However,
when a person would benefit or receive no detriment from having
"conviction" used in its broadest sense, then a jury verdict should
constitute a "conviction."
Applying this reasoning toRamdass, the court has misappliedSmith
to prohibit Ramdass from getting the benefit of the Simmons decision.
When the court attempted to determine the parole eligibility of Ramdass,
it was not for the purpose of imposing any punitive consequences or
taking away any right Ramdass may have to parole. The ultimate goal of
the analysis was to determine whether ajury should be given information
on that parole status. This fits precisely within the circumstances that
would require the "ordinary legal meaning" of conviction because it is a
determination of "something which should or may be done at a particular
stage in a criminal prosecution triable by jury .... "30 It also fits within
20 Wright, 248 Va. at 487,450 S.E.2d at 363.
2t Ramdass, 248 Va. at 520,450 S.E.2d at 361.
22 Id.
23 134 Va. 589, 113 S.E. 707 (1922).
24 U.S. Comp. St. § 8812-8819.
25 Smith, 134 Va. at 590, 113 S.E. at 707.
26 Id. at 592, 113 S.E. at 708.
27 Id. at 595, 113 S.E. at 709.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 594, 113 S.E. at 709.
30 Id. at 595, 113 S.E. at 709.
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the rationale behind the Smith decision to use the broadest meaning of
"conviction," since such a construction would not be to the detriment, but
would benefit Ramdass by allowing thejury to seethatlife imprisonment
without parole may be an appropriate and sufficient penalty. Thus Smith
shows that Ramdass' "conviction" was sufficient to count as a "strike"
when determining whether to give the jury parole law information.
The disallowance of this conviction as sufficient to establish parole
ineligibility defies logic. It is established in Simmons that the capital
murder conviction may be the final "strike" necessary to cause parole
ineligibility. The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized this when it
stated that the robbery and capital murder "convictions" arise from the
same transaction and are thus considered as only one felony. 31 How-
ever, due to the bifurcated nature of a capital murder trial, the court will
not have entered a judgment on the jury's verdict until after the penalty
phase of the trial. Thus the court is saying that the jury verdict of guilty
in a capital trial is a "conviction" but other non-capital jury verdict
convictions are not.
Prior to Simmons, it had been held that the Virginia Parole Board,
not the courts, were to make determinations of parole eligibility.32 These
decisions made sense when the question was when, if ever, the defendant
would be eligible for release. After Simmons, however, the question is
whether a defendant's parole status, if sentenced to life imprisonment, is
a necessary or permissible component of his right to rebut the state's case
for death and to present evidence in mitigation.3 3 Obviously this
determination must be made at trial. Understandably, there is uncertainty
about whether "same transaction" issues are to be resolved by the judge
or the jury,34 or whether testimony from a parole official is necessary.
After Simmons, however, the question must be answered at the trial of the
capital case.
A new parole statute has recently been enacted providing that any
person convicted of a felony that was committed on or after January 1,
1995, will be ineligible forparole. 35 For all capital defendants who meet
this requirement, parole information will be allowed to be given to the
jury under Simmons. If the defendant must rely on the earlier statutes to
determine his parole eligibility, then defense counsel must prepare to
litigate the parole status of the defendant. The aim is not only to prove
31 Ramdass, 248 Va. at 520,450 S.E.2d at 361.
32 Garrett v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 154, 157, 415 S.E.2d
245, 247 (1992). See also Jackson v. Shields, 438 F.Supp. 183, 184
(1977) (Boards of parole are "'given absolute discretion in matters of
parole"', thus "courts cannot properly grant a parole or determine
eligibility for parole.") (quoting Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.
1971)).
33 For a more comprehensive analysis of the questions that must
be determined by the trial court under Simmons, see Pohl & Turner, Ifat
First You Don't Succeed: The Real and Potential Impact of Simmons v.
South Carolina in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 2 8
(1994).
34 Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 1995 WL 86261, at*4 (Va. 1995)
("same transaction" determination held to be question of law, not fact,
but trial court did not rule).
ineligibility if that is the case, but to preserve a record of the exact parole
status of the defendant so that post-Simmons issues may be raised on
appeal if necessary.
If the capital defendant would be statutorily eligible for parole if
sentenced to life imprisonment, counsel should argue that, according to
reasoning detailed by the Supreme Court in Simmons, the defendant
should still be allowed to present parole information to the jury. The basis
for the argument is, like Simmons, that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that this information be provided due to the
misconceptions ofmostjurors concerning themeaning of "life imprison-
ment." Under the Eighth Amendment, the parole information is mitiga-
tion evidence that might serve as "a basis for a sentence less than death"
36
that must be allowed to be given to the jury. The withholding of such
information diminishes the reliability that the jury's verdict of death was
the appropriate punishment. This reliability requirement also stems from
the Eighth Amendment. It may also be argued that, based on Gardner v.
Florida,3 7 the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
is violated because he was limited in his ability to rebut the prosecution's
assertions of future dangerousness by his inability to show the jury that
a non-capital sentence could adequately protect society. 38 Although it
is generally wise to get parole information to the jury, there may be cases
when it would be best not to litigate this issue. Defense counsel must be
aware of the law of parole eligibility to determine whether this issue
should be litigated in a particular case.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Virginia will voluntarily
retreat from its strict reading of the Simmons decision. However, it is
important to litigate fully the issue of parole eligibility, even when the
capital defendant may be eligible for parole. This will preserve the issue
for later hearing by federal courts. Were it not for the preservation of
issues by defense counsel in the Simmons case, there would be no
Simmons decision by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore it is
vital to base parole arguments on federal as well as state grounds and to
continue to preserve these issues at each stage of the capital case.
Summary and analysis by:
Timothy B. Heavner
35 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-165.1 (1994).
36 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
37 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that reliance by court on confiden-
tial presentence report that was not made available to the defendani
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because it underminec
the right to reliable procedures at sentencing phase of capital trial anc
denied him an opportunity to "deny or explain" such information).
38 For a more complete discussion of these arguments for allowinj
parole information for parole eligible capital defendants, see case sum
mary of Simmons, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 4 (1994); sei
also Pohl & TumerlfatFirstYouDon'tSucceed: The Real andPotentia
Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 2 8 (1994).
